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subsections 2341(3) and (4), (2) can only save and sell seed
descended from a PVPA certificate owner for seeding
purposes, (3) in selling seed must primarily grow crops
from that seed for consumption, (4) in acquiring seed, must
primarily grow crops from that seed for consumption, (5)
can neither save nor sell seed harvested from that seed, (6)
must comply with state laws, and (7) cannot divert seed
originally sold for consumption to planting purposes.17
The Circuit Court held that the "saved seed" exception18
permitted up to one-half of a farmer's crop produced from a
protected novel plant society to be sold as seed in
competition with the owner of the novel variety.19
The appellate court held that the district court had erred
in reading the limitation (of the seed needed by the farmer
for the following year) into the statute and vacated the
permanent injunction against the Winterboers.
Supreme Court grant of review
On April 18, 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
review in the case.20
Implications of the case
The long-running case has attracted a great deal of
attention among farmers and in the seed trade.21  The
ultimate outcome, whether in the Supreme Court or the
Congress, will have important implications for firms
engaged in plant breeding.  On the other hand, the case as
finally laid to rest will have important implications also for
farmers in terms of the cost of seed.
FOOTNOTES
1 Pub. L. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2231-
2583.  See generally 12 Harl, Agricultural Law ch. 110
(1994).
2 See 7 C.F.R. Part 180.
3 7 U.S.C. § 2541.
4 35 U.S.C. § 161.
5 Id.
6 35 U.S.C. § 163.
7 7 U.S.C. § 2543.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 795 F. Supp. 915 (N.D.
Iowa 1991).
11 Delta and Pine Land Co. v. People Gin Co., 694 F.2d
1012 (5th Cir. 1983).
12 Id. at 1016.
13 795 F. Supp. 920.
14 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
15 982 F.2d 486, 489.
16 Id. at 490.
17 Id.
18 7 U.S.C. § 2543.
19 982 F.2d 486, 490.
20 62 U.S. Law Week 3683, April 19, 1994.
21 Amicus curiae briefs were filed by 16 firms in the
appellate court proceeding. 982 F.2d 486, 487 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors lived in Texas but had
purchased ranch land in Oklahoma with the intent to move
there when they retired. The Oklahoma ranch did not have a
residence. The debtors listed the Oklahoma property as
eligible for the Oklahoma homestead exemption but moved
to amend their schedules to list the Texas property as
eligible for the Texas homestead exemption. The debtor
husband made several statements in judicial proceedings
that the Oklahoma property was their homestead but the
wife made statements only that the Oklahoma property was
chosen as the residence for exemption purposes because the
bankruptcy filing was an attempt to reorganize the ranch
operation. The court held that the debtors had the right to
amend their exemption schedule and that, because the wife
made no misrepresentations in judicial proceedings as to
the debtors’ true residence, the debtors were not estopped
from claiming the Texas residence as the exempt
homestead. Because the Texas residence had already been
sold by the trustee, the court remanded the case for an
appropriate remedy. In re Osborn, 24 F.3d 1199 (10th
Cir. 1994).
LIFE INSURANCE. The debtor claimed as exempt,
under Ind.  Code § 27-1-12-14(d), the debtor’s interest in a
pre-paid life insurance policy on the debtor’s life. A
creditor objected to the exemption, arguing that the
exemption was unconstitutional under the state constitution.
The court held that, under Matter of Zumbrun, 626 N.E.2d
452 (Ind. 1993), unlimited exemptions violated the
constitutional requirement that exemptions be limited to a
reasonable amount. Because the life insurance exemption
was not limited, the life insurance exemption was
unconstitutional and the debtor’s exemption was denied. In
re Foster, 168 B.R. 183 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtor’s Chapter 7 schedules
included an exemption for the debtor’s home. A creditor
objected to the exemption and moved to have the debtor’s
discharge denied under Section 727(a)(2)(A) because the
debtor filed a false homestead exemption claim. The court
held that Section 727(a)(2)(A) requires that the debtor
transfer property with intent to hinder creditors and that an
exemption claim, even if false, was not a transfer. The court
also held that the exemption was allowed because the
exemption did not require that the debtor reside in the
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house every day but only that the debtor intend to return to
the house as a residence. In re Garcia, 168 B.R. 403 (D.
Ariz. 1994).
INVOLUNTARY PETITION . At a time when the
debtor was not generally making payments to creditors, the
debtor formed a family partnership and transferred $10
million in property to the partnership, effectively
transferring the property by gift to other family members.
The court held that an involuntary petition was allowed
because the debtor’s assets were rapidly and substantially
diminished by the gifts. In re Knoth, 168 B.R. 311
(Bankr. D. S.C. 1994).
    CHAPTER 11   -ALM § 13.03.*
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE. The debtors,
husband and wife, owned a ranch business and filed for
Chapter 11. The Bankruptcy Court had ruled that the
debtors could not retain any interest in the farm unless the
unsecured creditors were paid in full and had dismissed the
case because the debtors had no reasonable likelihood of
proposing a confirmable plan. The debtors had stated that
additional investment would come from loans from family
members and sale of post-petition assets. The District Court
held that the absolute priority rule exception was available
to the debtors but that the debtors failed to show that
substantial new money would be invested in the operation
to satisfy the rule. In addition, the District Court held that
the debtors had no reasonable likelihood of a confirmable
plan, even with the use of the absolute priority rule
exception. Coones v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 B.R. 247
(D. Wyo. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CONVERSION. The debtors had submitted a Chapter
12 plan for confirmation which was granted with
conditions. The debtors failed to meet the conditions and
the case was converted to Chapter 7. The debtors retained
the proceeds from the sale of crops which occurred during
the Chapter 12 case, arguing that the estate property
reverted to the debtors after the confirmation of the plan.
The court held that the property did not revert to the debtors
because the confirmation was conditional and the debtors
failed to meet the conditions. Therefore, the proceeds of the
sale and other accounts receivable became estate property
upon conversion of the case to Chapter 7. In re White, 25
F.3d 931 (10th Cir. 1994).
PLAN. The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan was confirmed
and the debtors had completed the three years of the plan.
The debtors sought a discharge but the unsecured creditor
objected, arguing that the debtors had not paid all
disposable income from one of the plan years. During the
plan period, the debtors had one year of net profit and two
years of net losses, with a resulting net loss over the three
years. The plan had language which indicated both that the
disposable income was to be determined on an annual basis
and that the disposable income was to be determined at the
end of the three years. The creditors favored the annual
determination and the debtors favored the three year
determination. The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the
disposable income was to be determined annually and
denied discharge until the debtors distributed property to
the unsecured creditors equal to the disposable income of
the first year. The District Court and appellate court
affirmed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court’s decision
deserved deference because that court had confirmed the
plan. Matter of Weber, 25 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1994).
TRUSTEE FEES. This case involved rulings on
several bankruptcy cases in which the debtors’ plans
provided for direct payments to creditors without payment
of the trustee’s fee. The trustee also objected to the plans’
provisions for payment of a trustee fee of only 10 percent of
the amounts paid to creditors through the trustee, instead of
10 percent of all amounts paid to the trustee (amounting to
11.11 percent of payments to creditors). The court held that
Chapter 12 plans may provide for direct payments to
creditors without payment of the trustee’s fee and that the
trustee’s fee was to be assessed only against payments
made to creditors. In re Westpfahl, 168 B.R. 337 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor filed for Chapter 11
five days before the scheduled foreclosure sale of the
debtor’s property. Although the U.S. Marshall’s office
received notice of the bankruptcy filing, the individual
Deputy Marshall conducting the sale did not learn about the
filing until the debtor notified the deputy when the deputy
arrived to sell the property. The deputy refused to halt the
sale unless ordered by the U.S. Marshall or a court;
however, the deputy did call the Marshall’s office after the
sale was concluded and was told about the bankruptcy
filing, at which time the Deputy Marshall voided the sale.
The court held that the IRS willfully violated the automatic
stay because the Deputy Marshall refused to halt the sale
once notified by the debtor of the filing. However, because
the debtor failed to show any damages from the attempted
sale, the debtor’s motion for sanctions and damages was
dismissed. In re Clarkson, 168 B.R. 93 (Bankr. D. S.C.
1994).
The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in
December 1989 and the confirmation order included the
provision that the bankruptcy estate property reverted to the
debtor upon confirmation. The debtor filed a joint tax return
for 1992 with the debtor’s spouse who had also filed for
bankruptcy (see case below) and claimed a refund. The IRS
intercepted the refund and applied it to taxes owed by the
debtor for 1990. The debtor argued that the interception of
the refund was a violation of the automatic stay. The court
held that because the refund was post-petition property and
was applied to a post-petition debt, the automatic stay did
not apply. In re Hudson, 168 B.R. 448 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1994).
The debtor’s spouse in the above case had filed for
bankruptcy in March 1993. The debtor sought damages
from the IRS for the interception of the 1992 refund
described above. The IRS argued that it was entitled to
setoff the pre-petition 1992 refund against the debtor’s pre-
petition 1990 tax liability. The court held that the right of
setoff was subject to obtaining a prior court order;
therefore, the interception of the refund was a violation of
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the automatic stay. The court also held that the sovereign
immunity of the IRS was waived by the IRS claim in the
case and awarded the debtor attorney’s fees incurred in
bringing the action against the IRS. However, the court
implied that the IRS would be allowed to keep the refund
under its right of setoff. In re Hudson, 168 B.R. 449
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtor had obtained a judgment
that a late filed claim of the IRS was disallowed; however,
the IRS sent the debtor an assessment notice for the taxes
involved in the disallowed claim during the appeals of the
disallowance ruling.  The IRS, however, told the debtor that
it would not attempt any enforcement of the assessment
until the appeal was settled.  The Bankruptcy Court held
that the assessment violated the discharge injunction of
Section 524(a) but that the assessment would be allowed to
stand because no harm was done to the debtor. The District
Court noted that holding was also justified because the
confirmed plan provided for payment of post-confirmation
assessments.  In re Norris Grain Co., 168 B.R. 264 (M.D.
Fla. 1994), aff’g, 138 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
The taxes involved were assessed 1489 days before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. The debtor filed an offer
to compromise within 240 days after the assessment and the
offer was pending 653 days before rejection by the IRS.
Thus, under Sections 507(a)(7)(A)(ii) and 523(a)(1)(A), the
taxes were dischargeable because the total of 240 days plus
30 plus the length of the pending compromise (923 days)
was less than the number of days from the date of
assessment to the date of the petition (1489 days). After the
first one was rejected, the debtor filed a second offer of
compromise which was pending on the date of the petition,
but the second offer was made more than 240 days after the
assessment. The IRS argued that the first offer of
compromise suspended the running of the first 240 day
period so that the second offer would be considered as filed
within the 240 days after assessment. The court rejected
this argument as not supported by the statutes involved and
held that the taxes were dischargeable. In re Callahan, 168
B.R. 272 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
The debtor failed to file and pay taxes owed for 1974-
1981.  Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the debtor pled
guilty, under I.R.C. 7203, to willfully failing to file an
income tax return for 1976 in exchange for dropping other
charges.  The debtor also filed returns for the missing years
but only paid the taxes due for one year. The IRS argued
that the taxes still owed for the 1974-1981 taxable years
were nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1)(C) for
willful attempt to evade taxes. The court held that the
debtor's guilty plea was an admission only of the element of
willfulness of the failure to file and pay taxes but did not
prove that the debtor made any act or commission to evade
taxes; therefore, the taxes were dischargeable. The District
Court reversed, holding that the debtor’s failure to file
income tax returns and to pay the taxes were sufficient to
bar discharge of the taxes. The appellate court affirmed the
District Court.  Matter of Toti, 24 F.3d 806 (6th Cir.
1994), aff’g, 149 B.R. 829 (E.D. Mich. 1993), rev’g, 141
B.R. 126 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992).
LIQUIDATING TRUSTS. The IRS has issued revised
conditions for considering whether it will issue advance
rulings classifying entities created under Chapter 11 plans
as liquidating trusts. Rev. Proc. 94-45, I.R.B. 1994-28,
124, modifying, Rev. Proc.  91-15, 1991-1 C.B. 484.
REFUND. The debtor sought to offset an IRS tax claim
by the amount of refund the debtors claimed in a 1992
filing of the 1986 and 1987 returns.  Although the debtors’
1992 refund claim was timely under I.R.C. § 6511(a), the
refund claim was untimely under I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A)
because the refund claim was not made within three years
after the debtors paid any taxes against which the refund
claim was made. In re Ford, 168 B.R. 173 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1994).
CONTRACTS
GUARANTY. The plaintiff was a supplier of raw
potatoes and the defendant was a dealer in processed potato
products. The defendant had asked the plaintiff to sell
potatoes to a processor but the plaintiff declined because of
the processor’s poor credit record. The plaintiff claimed
that the defendant offered to guarantee any sale of potatoes
to the processor and the plaintiff then agreed to the sale.
The processor failed to pay for the potatoes and filed for
bankruptcy and the plaintiff sued for recovery on the
guaranty. The defendant asserted the statute of frauds as a
defense because the guaranty was not in writing. The court
held that the statute of frauds did not apply because the jury
found that the defendant benefited from the guaranty. The
defendant also argued that the guaranty should be
discharged because the plaintiff failed to protect the
collateral, the processor’s accounts receivable, because the
plaintiff failed to timely file a notice to preserve its rights to
the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act trust. The
court agreed. Century 21 Products v. Glacier Sales, 875
P.2d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2][g].* The
defendants had obtained secured installment loans from the
FmHA and had defaulted on the loans in 1983. The parties
had made several attempts to restructure the debt by selling
the collateral but without much success. The court found
that the FmHA was enjoined from accelerating farm debts
by the two Coleman cases and FmHA administrative
decisions for a total of 1015 days between the date of the
defendants’ defaults and the FmHA filing of a foreclosure
suit. The defendants argued that the suit was barred by the
six year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The
court held that the statute of limitations was tolled during
the 1015 days, under 28 U.S.C. § 2416(b), because the
defendants’ were exempt from legal process during the
court and administrative injunctions. The court also held
that the statute barred only the installment payments due
before six years and 1015 days before the filing and not the
whole debt. U.S. v. Rich, 853 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Cal.
1994).
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MEAT AND POULTRY. The FSIS has adopted as
final regulations governing mandatory information labeling
on meat and poultry products. 59 Fed. Reg. 40209 (Aug. 8,
1994).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff purchased
the herbicide Beacon manufactured by the defendant for
control of the plaintiff’s Johnson grass. The herbicide
apparently failed to control the grass and the plaintiff sued
for damages to the crop based on breach of express
warranty and redhibition (misrepresentation) of the sale of a
defective herbicide. The defendant argued that the actions
were preempted by FIFRA. The court held that the action
was not preempted by FIFRA. Prather v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 852 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. La. 1994).
POULTRY PRODUCTS. Under a recently enacted
California statute, Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 26661,
poultry products could only be labeled as “fresh” if the
products had been stored above 25 degrees. Under the
federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), 21 U.S.C.
§§ 451-470, and USDA regulations, poultry products may
be labeled as fresh if stored between 0 and 40 degrees. The
plaintiffs argued that the PPIA preempted the state statute.
The state argued that its statute only prohibited certain
labeling and did not add any labeling requirement or require
a different label than the federal act. The court held that a
prohibition was equal to a requirement and that, because the
state law prohibited a label that the federal law allowed, the
state requirement was in addition to and different from the
federal requirement and was preempted. The court also held
that, because the state labeling requirement was not
severable from the similar requirements for advertising and
other marketing methods, the state was enjoined from
enforcing any of the statute. National Broiler Council v.
Voss, 851 F. Supp. 1461 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s will bequeathed the residuary estate to four
charitable organizations and one individual. The will stated
that estate and inheritance taxes were to be paid from the
residuary estate without adjustment among the residue
beneficiaries. The executor obtained a probate court order,
with the consent of the individual residual legatee,
allocating all of the taxes to the individual’s share. The
court held that the charitable deduction for the four
charitable bequests would be reduced by the estate and
inheritance taxes because the decedent’s will was
unambiguous and the probate court order was obtained
through an ex parte non-adversarial proceeding. Est. of
McKay v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-362.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* In 1965 the
decedent’s parent established a trust for the decedent in
which the decedent had a testamentary power to appoint the
trust corpus to persons including the decedent’s spouse. The
decedent’s will appointed the trust corpus to a marital trust.
The surviving spouse claimed to have learned about both
trusts after the death of the decedent and filed a written
disclaimer of any interest in the marital trust within nine
months after learning about the trusts. The IRS ruled that
the disclaimer was valid if the surviving spouse learned
about the trusts less than nine months before making the
disclaimer, but the IRS would not rule on the factual
question of when the surviving spouse learned about the
trusts. Ltr. Rul. 9431022, May 6, 1994.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* A testamentary trust became irrevocable prior to
September 1985 and had several current beneficiaries. The
trustees proposed to obtain a state court order separating the
trust into pro rata trusts for each beneficiary with the same
terms as the original trust, except that different trustees may
be eventually chosen for the trusts. The IRS ruled that the
partition of the trust would not result in income tax
recognition or subject the trusts to GSTT or gift tax and the
basis and holding period of trust assets would carry over to
the new separate trusts. Ltr. Rul. 9430014, April 28, 1994.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The decedent had
executed a joint will with a predeceased spouse, conveying
their ranch to the survivor, the decedent, with remainders to
charities and a nephew. The survivor had the right to
encumber or mortgage any of the property, to execute
mineral leases, and to convey royalties on part of the
property. The decedent remarried and used the property to
secure a loan, the proceeds of which were given to the new
spouse. The decedent also conveyed mineral interests to the
spouse by royalty deed. The IRS ruled that the decedent had
a general power of appointment over the ranch sufficient to
include it in the decedent’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9431004,
April 26, 1994.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. In 1981 the decedent
had made gifts of mineral rights and filed a gift tax return
valuing the property at $14,769. In 1985, the decedent’s
estate tax return listed the gifts as adjusted taxable gifts at
the value claimed on the gift tax return. In 1986, the IRS
revalued the mineral rights gifts at $135,750 and assessed
additional estate tax. The estate argued that the revaluation
of the gifts was barred by the statute of limitations on the
gifts. The court held that the estate tax statute of limitations
applied and that the gift tax statute of limitations did not
apply because no gift tax was assessed. Evanson v. U.S.,
94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,174 (8th Cir. 1994).
TAX LIEN. During the administration of the estate the
executor pledged estate property as security for loans used
to pay federal and state estate taxes. The loans were
eventually repaid with other loans and the collateral was
sold to third parties. Several years later, the IRS claimed a
lien on the sold properties based on unpaid estate taxes.
Under I.R.C. § 6324(a)(1), a federal estate tax lien is
divested as to property which is used to pay charges against
the estate and administrative expenses, if approved by a
court of appropriate jurisdiction. Although the stipulated
facts recited that the estate property was used to pay estate
taxes under approval of a state probate court, the IRS
argued that the value of the property in excess of the loan
amount remained subject to the lien. The court held that
partial divestment was appropriate only if a portion of the
loan proceeds was used to pay charges and administrative
expenses, not if only a portion of the value of the property
is used as collateral. Therefore, the estate tax lien on the
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properties was divested by the loan which was entirely used
to pay federal and state estate taxes. United States v.
Davis, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,175 (W.D. Mo.
1994).
VALUATION . The decedent died in 1985 and the
estate included an automobile salvage yard and a fill dirt
dump. The estate tax return in 1988 valued the property at
$735,000 and did not include any reduction for
environmental problems with the land. In 1990 an EPA
investigation found the property to be contaminated with
automobile oil and grease, leaking underground tanks,
groundwater contamination and regulated solid waste.
Because of a lack of evidence as to the amount of
contamination which occurred between 1985 and 1990, the
court allowed a discounting of the estate tax value of the
property by the estimated costs to clean the soil, remove
underground tanks and to conduct hydrogeological studies.
Est. of Necastro v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-352.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer was a
family farm corporation which filed a consolidated return
with its subsidiaries. Because the gross income of the
corporations exceeded $25 million, the corporations were
required to use the accrual method of accounting and to
maintain a suspense account. Two of the subsidiaries had a
contraction of income from farming in one taxable year.
The taxpayer argued that because the gross income test for
use of accrual accounting was determined at the
consolidated level, the determination of contraction of farm
income should also be determined at the consolidated level.
The IRS ruled that the statute, I.R.C. § 447(i)(3), required
that the reduction in gross receipts from farming had to be
measured on a separate corporation basis. Ltr. Rul.
9428004, April 7, 1994.
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION-ALM § 4.03[7].* The
taxpayer was a physician who had invested in a company
developing solar heating systems. When the company
needed additional capital, the taxpayer personally
guaranteed a note given by the company. The taxpayer
claimed a business bad debt deduction for the amount paid
on the guarantee when the company defaulted. The court
held that because the taxpayer did not do business with the
company and was not employed by the company, the
taxpayer was limited to a nonbusiness bad debt deduction.
Weber v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-341.
DUES DEDUCTION. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations disallowing the dues deduction for dues paid to
luncheon clubs, airline and hotel clubs and any organization
which has the principal purpose of conducting
entertainment activities or gaining access for the members
to entertainment facilities. the regulations  could allow the
deduction for service club dues. The regulations reflect the
changes made by OBRA 1993. 59 Fed. Reg. 41414 (Aug.
12, 1994), amending Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].*  The IRS has
issued tables, revised for inflation, detailing the limitation
on depreciation deductions for automobiles first placed in
service during 1994:
   Tax Year      Amount  
1st tax year........................................... $2,960
2d tax year.............................................. 4,700
3d tax year.............................................. 2,850
Each succeeding year ............................ 1,675
The IRS also issued tables providing the amounts to be
included in income for automobiles first leased during
1994.  Rev. Proc. 94-53, I.R.B. 1994-32, 18.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was
an airline pilot who purchased a farm near the taxpayer’s
parents’ farm. The court held that the taxpayer operated the
farm with the intent to make a profit because the taxpayer
used innovative farming techniques, followed established
farming practices, spent all non-flight time on the farm,
performed all the labor, and intended to retire on the farm
and live off the income. The court noted that the losses
were attributable to start-up costs and problems beyond the
taxpayer’s control. Although the court found that the
expectation of profit was not reasonable, the court held that
the taxpayer had an honest intent to farm the land for profit.
Buckner v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-376.
NET OPERATING LOSS. The taxpayer was a parent
corporation in an affiliated group which acquired an S
corporation. In the post-acquisition tax year, the subsidiary
S corporation business had a net operating loss which
contributed to the taxpayer’s net operating loss on the
consolidated return. The taxpayer attempted to carry the net
loss back to the pre-acquisition tax year. The court held that
the taxpayer could not carry the net loss attributable to the S
corporation back to pre-acquisition tax years. Amorient,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 11 (1994).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
September 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.86 5.78 5.74 5.71
110% AFR 6.46 6.36 6.31 6.28
120% AFR 7.06 6.94 6.88 6.84
Mid-term
AFR 7.05 6.93 6.87 6.83
110% AFR 7.77 7.62 7.55 7.50
120% AFR 8.49 8.32 8.24 8.18
Long-term
AFR 7.63 7.49 7.42 7.38
110% AFR 8.41 8.24 8.16 8.10
120% AFR 9.19 8.99 8.89 8.83
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
BUILT-IN GAINS. The taxpayer was a corporation
engaged in the production and harvesting of timber. The
corporation had two subsidiaries which it planned to
liquidate so that the taxpayer would be eligible for the S
corporation election. The taxpayer used the accrual method
of accounting and the trees harvested by the taxpayer had
growing cycles of 60 and 100 years. The IRS ruled that the
income derived from the cutting of timber and the sale of
the logs during the recognition period (10 years from the
date of the election) would not constitute recognized built-
in gain if the timber is cut during the recognition period.
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The sale of logs cut before the recognition period and sold
during the recognition period would produce built-in gain.
Ltr. Rul. 9430026, May 2, 1994.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer sold a
residence and purchased a new residence when the taxpayer
was over 55 years old. The taxpayer’s tax return preparer
made the I.R.C. § 121 election to exclude the gain from the
sale of the residence. Several years later, the taxpayer sold
the second residence and purchased a third and claimed the
Section 121 election again. The IRS denied the second
election because only one Section 121 election is allowed
each taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that the first election
was an error and sought revocation of the election on the
grounds the sale and reinvestment provisions of I.R.C. §
1034 were mandatory and would have covered the gain
involved. The court held that the election could not be
revoked more than three years after it was made and could
not be revoked because of reliance on the tax return
preparer. Robarts v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 5 (1994).
While the taxpayer was married, the taxpayer and
spouse sold their jointly owned residence and elected on a
joint return to defer the gain because the couple intended to
purchase a new residence within two years. However, the
couple divorced and only the taxpayer purchased a new
residence. The taxpayer attempted to amend the original
joint return to include in income the gain from the spouse’s
share of the residence but the spouse refused to sign the
return. The IRS assessed the taxpayer for the spouse’s
nondeferrable gain. Although the court agreed that the
taxpayer and spouse each realized half of the gain from the
sale of the joint residence and each had the ability to
purchase a separate residence to qualify for deferring each’s
share of the gain, the taxpayer was still liable for the
spouse’s gain because the filing of the joint return made
each jointly and several liable for the gain. Murphy v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-364.
PROPERTY
FENCES. The plaintiff and defendant were adjoining
landowners. The fence between the properties became worn
and the plaintiff requested that the defendant replace half of
the fence while the plaintiff replaced the other half. When
the defendant refused, the plaintiff notified the township
board which ordered the defendant to replace one-half of
the fence. When the defendant still failed to comply, the
board gave the plaintiff permission to obtain bids for
replacement of one-half of the fence, selected the lower bid
and had the fence replaced, with the plaintiff paying the
contractor. The plaintiff sought recovery, under Minn. Stat.
§ 344.03 of double the cost of replacing the defendant’s
half of the fence.  The defendant argued that the statute did
not apply because the defendant’s land adjoining the fence
was not used or improved. The court held that the statute
only required that some portion of the land adjoining the
fence needed to be improved or used. The defendant also
argued that because no prior notice of the first fence
viewing was given to the defendant, the statute could not be
enforced against the defendant. The court held that the
statute required strict compliance with the notice
requirements and that any post-fence viewing statements by
the defendant did not waive the jurisdiction error of lack of
notice.  Therefore, the award of double costs was improper
and void. Rice v. Kringler, 517 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. App.
1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
DRAGNET CLAUSE. The debtors purchased fertilizer
and chemicals on credit from the creditor over several
years. Each year the debtors would grant the creditor a
security interest in farm property and would pay off the
loan at the end of the year. In 1992, the debtors obtained
fertilizer and chemicals from the creditor but filed for
bankruptcy before the security agreement was signed. The
creditor filed a secured claim for the 1992 debt, arguing that
the dragnet clause in the 1991 security agreement covered
the 1992 loan. The District Court had held that the dragnet
clause did not apply to the 1992 debt because the course of
conduct between the parties demonstrated that a new
security agreement was required each year. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the 1991 dragnet clause was
clear and unambiguous and applied to the 1992 debt if, as
required under Wisconsin law, the 1992 debt related to the
1991 debt. The court held that because the 1992 debt was
for the same purposes as the 1991 debt and was identical in
form and substance, the 1992 debt was related to the 1991
debt and was subject to the 1991 dragnet clause. Matter of
Kazmierczak, 24 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1994).
STATE TAXATION
OPEN SPACE. The plaintiff was a Virginia
corporation owned by a Swiss corporation. The plaintiff
owned open land in Texas and applied for valuation as open
land under Tex. Tax Code § 23.52-3. The application was
denied because Tex. Tax Code § 23.56 made open space
valuation unavailable to corporations which are required by
state or federal law to register their ownership of land
because of foreign ownership of the corporation. The
plaintiff argued that the statute violated Tex. Const. art.
VIII, § 1-d(a) which provided for the valuation of open
space land at its use value. The court held that the purpose
of the constitutional provision was the preservation of open
land and that the Section 23.56 limitation based on
ownership was not rationally related to the state’s interest in
preserving open space; therefore, the statute was
unconstitutional. HL Farm Corp. v. Self, 877 S.W.2d 288
(Tex. 1994).
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WATER
EASEMENT. A married couple purchased a ranch with
water rights. The wife’s parents were co-signers of the
purchase and also owned a neighboring ranch (the Glenn
ranch). The husband’s parents also owned a neighboring
ranch (the Kellum ranch). The couple extended the
irrigation system to the Glenn ranch and received full title
to their ranch. All three ranches were run as one unit but not
as a formal partnership. The water rights on the couple’s
ranch were amended to include the Glenn and Kellum
ranches with all of the water coming from one source on the
couple’s ranch. The plaintiff acquired the Glenn ranch
through foreclosure and the defendant acquired the couple’s
and Kellum ranches also through foreclosure. The plaintiff
argued that it owned a portion of the water rights allocable
to the Glenn ranch under the amended water rights and that
the plaintiff had an implied easement or easement by
estoppel for transport of the water right over the
defendant’s land. The court held that the amendments to the
water rights contract did include a grant of water to the
Glenn ranch; however, because the ranches were
maintained in separate ownership, no implied easement was
created. The court also held that an easement by estoppel
was not created because the original owners made no
agreement to create an easement for transport of the water
to the Glenn ranch. Wayt v. Buerkel, 875 P.2d 499 (Or.
App. 1994).
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by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
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